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INTRODUCTION
Probation officers are uniquely able to engage in both ends of
the criminal justice system.1 Not only are probation officers given
back-end authority to monitor a probationer after judgement is
imposed by a court, but they are also given front-end discretion to
decide whether to reintroduce an offender back into the system.2
This broad authority is especially worrisome in the context of

* Juris Doctor, Brigham Young University Law School, 2021. Many thanks to Professor
John Fee and the BYU Law Review for their invaluable help.
1. Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing
Structures, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 683 (1993).
2. Id. at 681–83.
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private for-profit probation.3 Indeed, private probation officers
currently exercise the executive function of prosecution and fee
collection, the legislative function of budget management, and the
judicial function of sentencing—and all with profit incentives that
hardly coincide with the interests of their probationers.4
Accordingly, for-profit private probation practices may raise
serious constitutional concerns. In fact, a unanimous Eleventh
Circuit panel recently held that a private probation company had
no constitutional right to independently modify probation
conditions for purely financial reasons.5 And this decision will
likely open the door for future challenges. Indeed, claimants are
likely to continue challenging similar practices under both the
Eighth Amendment, which prevents for-profit companies from
excessively fining probationers, as well as the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which similarly prohibits private
probation companies from imposing sentencing enhancements
solely to increase revenues.6
Moreover, for-profit probation companies may also raise
serious ethical concerns. Indeed, scholarship continues to show that
private probation companies have played an important role in the
steady increase of probation fees over recent years,7 a trend which
has undeniably stunted criminal rehabilitation.8 Accordingly,
unethical private probation practices not only harm the individual,
but they may also contribute to higher rates of recidivism.
In support of further efforts to improve the criminal justice
system, Part I of this Note provides a historical account of
the probation system, one which was created by non-profit,
3. See United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
district court committed plain error when it gave “ultimate responsibility” of one of a
defendant’s probation conditions to the probation officer and emphasizing that the role of
the probation officer should be primarily “ministerial”) (citations omitted).
4. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 885 (2009) (“This is particularly
true where . . . there is no procedure for judicial factfinding and the sole trier of fact is the
one accused of bias.”).
5. Harper v. Pro. Prob. Servs. Inc., 976 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 2020).
6. See Profiting from Probation: America’s “Offender-Funded” Probation Industry, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 5 (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05/
profiting-probation/americas-offender-funded-probation-industry [hereinafter Profiting
From Probation].
7. See Paul Peterson, Supervision Fees: State Policies and Practice, 76 FED. PROB. 40, 44, (2012).
8. See Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in
the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1505–06 (2016).
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religious actors. That system later became the exclusive domain of
state and local governments, until it became prohibitively
expensive following the massive increase in incarceration
following the “War on Drugs.” Ironically, local governments have
since returned probation authority to for-profit companies. In
response to this history, Part II of this Note then proceeds by
arguing that the current for-profit private probation system is
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution. Finally, Part III describes a modern nonprofit private probation system in which local governments could
offload some of their tremendous probation costs without violating
the constitutional rights of probationers.
I. THE AMERICAN PROBATION SYSTEM
A. The Religious Origins of Probation in the United States
The first instance of probation in the United States occurred in
1841, when John Augustus, a Boston bootmaker, petitioned a local
judge to release a man charged with the crime of public
drunkenness into his custody.9 Deeply moved by the accused’s
disheveled appearance while awaiting sentencing, Augustus
expressed his concern that criminal charges would cause the
drunkard to “‘never be a man again.’”10 Following his petition and
perhaps owing to Augustus’s prior experience helping alcoholics,
the judge eventually agreed to defer sentencing for three weeks.11
After the probationary period expired, the judge allowed the
accused to go free with a nominal fine, finding that Augustus had
sufficiently reformed the man.12
Today, a plaque on Boston’s Court Street memorializes John
Augustus’s impact on the criminal justice system with the
following inscription:
John Augustus—Moved by the plight of the unfortunate in the
jails and prisons of his day a humble Boston shoemaker began a
great movement in the reformation of offenders when in 1841 he

9. DAVID DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 22 (1962).
10. See Robert Panzarella, Theory and Practice of Probation on Bail in the Report of John
Augustus, 66 FED. PROB. 38, 40 (2002).
11. See id. at 39.
12. DRESSLER, supra note 9, at 22–23.
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took from the court for a period of probation one who, under his
care and with his friendship became a man again.13

After helping his first client rediscover his humanity, Augustus
would devote the rest of his life to serving the accused. Indeed,
between 1841 and 1859, Augustus would spare almost 2,000
individuals from going to prison, spending his entire fortune in the
process.14 Augustus not only helped many men, women, and
children avoid prison, but he also helped them find shelter,
clothing, food, community, and employment.15 Because according
to Augustus, the purpose of the criminal justice system was “to
reform criminals, and to prevent crime and not to punish
maliciously, or from a spirit of revenge.”16
But not all Bostonians agreed with John Augustus’s criminal
reformations. In particular, local police officers—who were
receiving commissions for criminal convictions in the nineteenth
century—”often suffered financially” from the evolving
probationary system.17 Other members of the Boston gentry also
disagreed with the idea of reintroducing the accused back into
society on moral grounds. For example, one especially influential
Bostonian published the following anonymous accusation in a
local newspaper:
Mr. Augustus is undermining the foundations of the church, as
well as the state . . . . What is to be done? I will suggest . . . that
some of my aristocratic friends, go in a body to Mr. Augustus’s
house after nightfall (he lives at 65 Chamber St.), and throw some
bottles of coal tar through his parlor windows. If that don’t fix
him, I don’t know what will.18

13. A photograph of the plaque may be found at FILE: BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS HQ
JOHN AUGUSTUS PLAQUE.JPG, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS, http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Boston_Public_Schools_HQ_John_Augustus_ plaque.JPG (last visited Mar. 30,
2022) (emphasis added).
14. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 155–56 (1997).
15. Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 938 (1995).
16. JOHN AUGUSTUS, A REPORT OF THE LABORS OF JOHN AUGUSTUS 23 (Boston, Wright
& Hasty 1852), Gale Nineteenth Century Collections Online.
17. Charles Lindner, John Augustus, Father of Probation, and the Anonymous Letter, 70
FED. PROB. 77, 77 (2006).
18. See Charles Lindner, Thacher, Augustus, and Hill—The Path to Statutory Probation in
the United States and England, 71 FED. PROB. 36, 38 (2007) (quoting Anonymous Letter
published in Chronotype (1847)).
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Thus, “‘[a]s the number of cases accumulated with Mr. Augustus,
so did his cares and troubles,’” such that Augustus ultimately
became destitute in his final years.19
Notwithstanding his unfair mistreatment, Augustus’s legacy
and his idea of providing criminal defendants “a period of proving
oneself” with a chance at “subsequent forgiveness” continued in
the American legal system.20 Most notably, not long after
Augustus’s death, the State of Massachusetts created its own
probation program for juvenile defendants in 1878.21 Following
Massachusetts’s example, other governments began adopting
probation systems in “attempts to avoid the mechanical application
of the harsh and cruel precepts of a rigorous, repressive criminal
law.”22 And by 1956, every U.S. state had adopted its own probation
laws for adult and juvenile defendants.23
Thus, private religious actors “were the early forerunners” of
the probation system that exists today.24 In fact, early probation
officers were little more than volunteers from various religious
sects—it was not until governments saw a “need for presentence
investigations . . . [that] the volunteer probation officer was
converted into a paid position.”25
Following this era of volunteer-based, philanthropic probation,
states began hiring a new probation workforce in the mid-twentieth
century, consisting primarily of retired sheriffs and ex-policemen.26
Unlike the previous system, these new probation officers exercised
police powers.27 And the transition was far from seamless. As at
least one 1970s survey shows, some probation officers held largely
19. Lindner, supra note 17, at 78 (quoting Anonymous Letter Concerning the Labors
of Mr. John Augustus (1858) (on file with the New York Historical Society)).
20. Lindner, supra note 18, at 38.
21. Petersilia, supra note 14, at 156.
22. U.N. Department of Social Affairs, The Legal Origins of Probation, in PROBATION,
PAROLE AND COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 81, 82 (Robert M. Carter & Leslie T. Wilkins eds., 2d
ed. 1976). At common law, criminal punishments were extremely severe and conviction for
any serious crime could lead to death; minor crimes were punished with beatings and
mutilations. See also CHARLES LIONEL CHUTE & MARJORIE BELL, CRIME, COURTS, AND
PROBATION 4 (1956).
23. Petersilia, supra note 14, at 156.
24. Christine S. Schloss & Leanne F. Alarid, Standards in the Privatization of Probation
Services: A Statutory Analysis, 32 CRIM. JUST. REV. 233, 234 (2007).
25. Petersilia, supra note 14, at 156 (citation omitted).
26. See id. at 156–57.
27. Id.
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ministerial positions, whereas others were responsible for as many
as fifty different tasks, often with competing interests.28
Perhaps owing to this uncertainty, some states began to
reintroduce private companies back into the probation system in
the mid-1970s. But it is likelier that private probation became even
more attractive to states during the sharp increase of crime during
the “War on Drugs” in the 1970s, as states began to realize that they
could cut penal costs by outsourcing probation to private
companies.29 In particular, Florida was the first state to formally
codify this new practice of costless probation, which authorized
private entities—namely the Salvation Army—to supervise
misdemeanor probationers in 1975.30 Missouri, Colorado, and
Tennessee followed suit in the 1980s.31
B. The Modern Probation Regime in the United States
Private probation took a different, and perhaps darker turn in
the late 1980s, when states began to sell the debt that criminals
incurred during sentencing proceedings to private companies.32
Because these private companies could use the power of local
governments to secure their debts, this arrangement incentivized
private businesses to increase the amount of fees and interest that
each offender owed.33 As a result, a recent study concluded that the
probation practices developed during this period would eventually
function as “a net-widener that played a role in the build-up of
mass incarceration.”34
For example, in 1990, the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”)
published an influential set of recommendations which encouraged
local governments to “[m]aximize [c]orrectional [a]gencies’
[i]ncentives” to collect fines and fees from probationers; “[l]evy
[f]ees on [l]arge [n]umbers of [o]ffenders” while restricting the

28. TIMOTHY L. FITZHARRIS, CA. PROB., PAROLE, & CORREC. ASSOC., PROBATION IN AN
ERA OF DIMINISHING RESOURCES 19 (1979).
29. See generally Charles A. Lindquist, The Private Sector in Corrections: Contracting
Probation Services from Community Organizations, 44 FED. PROB. 58 (1980).
30. See id. at 59–60; see also Schloss & Alarid, supra note 24, at 234.
31. See Schloss & Alarid, supra note 24, at 234–35.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 238–39.
34. See Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of
Mass Incarceration, 35 L. & POL’Y 51, 64 (2013).
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availability of fee waivers; and develop prompt and severe
consequences for criminal debt.35 These draconian suggestions
were unfortunately adopted by many states.36
In fact, by 2014, essentially every state would enact at least some
form of offender-funded probation.37 For example, at the low end
of the spectrum, forty-nine states currently charge probationers for
their electronic monitoring devices.38 But many states give private
probation companies a much more pronounced role in their
criminal systems.
According to Human Rights Watch,39 at least twelve states have
given private companies near-total control over misdemeanor
probationers: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Tennessee, Utah, and
Washington.40 Even in states where probation is not completely
privatized, for-profit businesses are often asked to provide partial
probation services.41 Because most misdemeanor probation terms
last anywhere between six months and several years, private
companies often request warrants, commence trial proceedings, or
otherwise threaten probationers with incarceration in order to
ensure that each bill is paid.42
Importantly, probation services are often expensive. For
example, drug testing probation services, the most common
probation service, carry mandatory testing fees of up to $1,250 per
year.43 Another example is GPS monitoring, which usually costs

35. DALE PARENT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., RECOVERING
CORRECTIONAL COSTS THROUGH OFFENDER FEES 23–24 (1990).
36. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 41.
37. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(May 19, 2014), https://perma.cc/XW4N-UWRC.
38. Id.
39. Profiting From Probation, supra note 6, at 5.
40. Id. at 12 n.3.
41. Id. at 15–17.
42. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTRODUCTION AND CRIMINALIZATION 71, 83 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).
43. Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’
Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486, 503 (2016).
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probationers $400 to $500 per month,44 plus a $179.50 setup fee.45
Even after installation, devices such as ignition interlock machines
often require monthly or bimonthly calibrations, which can cost
between $60 to $150 each time.46 All told, these private fees can
amount to two or three times the cost that probationers were
originally charged by the court,47 sometimes requiring probationers
to surrender as much as 35% of their income.48
Moreover, these expensive fees entrench probationers in the
criminal system. For example, consider the large portion of “pay
only” probationers who remain in the probation system only
because they “were sentenced to probation for failure to pay a fine
or fee . . . [and until] a ‘pay only’ probationer settles his or her debt
with the court, the probation sentence [will not] end[].”49 These
individuals are especially vulnerable to the essentially limitless
array of fines and fees at a for-profit company’s disposal, which
allows the company “to offset public costs for virtually every stage,
service, and component of criminal justice administration.”50
California alone recognizes more than 3,000 fees.51
The perverse result is that private probation companies end up
charging much more for the same services that used to be costless
to the accused.52 And because local governments are the entities
making these contracts, probationers are locked into expensive

44. Set Up to Fail: The Impact of Offender-Funded Private Probation on the Poor, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 44 (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/02/20/setfail/impact-offender-funded-private-probation-poor [hereinafter Set Up to Fail].
45. Eric Markowitz, Chain Gain 2.0: If You Can’t Afford This GPS Ankle Bracelet, You Get
Thrown in Jail, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/9N9J-VZ2V.
46. How Much Does An Ignition Interlock Device Cost?, SMART START INC. (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://www. smartstartinc.com/blog/ignition-interlock-cost/.
47. Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing Transparency and Accountability to
Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 455, 475 (2011).
48. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 155 (2010).
49. Megan Grindstaff, The Slow Death of a Government Contracting Model: “User-Funded”
Contracts in Privatized Misdemeanor Probation Monitoring, 48 PUB. CONT. L.J. 797, 802 (2019).
50. Darryl K. Brown, The Case for A Trial Fee: What Money Can Buy in Criminal Process,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1415, 1429 (2019) (citing Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett,
Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in Contemporary United States, 115
AM. J. SOCIO. 1753, 1769–73 (2010)).
51. Harris et al., supra note 50, at 1759.
52. Set Up to Fail, supra note 44, at 53.

1802

1803

Make Probation Non-Profit Again

prices without the ability to select cheaper alternatives.53 Indeed,
many probationers end up paying off their criminal debts for the
rest of their lives,54 and if they stop paying their debts, they
risk incarceration.55
Accordingly, the ubiquitously philanthropic nature of
probation is no more. In place of a system that was primarily
focused on rehabilitating criminals for the sake of creating a better
society, today’s probation system is primarily concerned with
alleviating overincarceration, a goal which has ironically resulted
in unacceptably high rates of recidivism.56 Indeed, the data confirm
this trend.57 While the probation population has increased by 329%
since 1980, incarceration rates appear to be on the decline.58 The
reason for this trend may be due to the fact that probation is much
cheaper than incarceration, as manifest by the astounding
probationer-to-prisoner ratio in the United States: Approximately
3.6 million people are on probation,59 whereas roughly 2.3 million
people are incarcerated.60
Tragically, the “system that was once . . . oriented by the idea of
reintegration of prisoners into the community is now oriented toward
isolating and containing this population.”61 Accordingly, for-profit
53. See Sharon Cohen, Poor Offenders Pay High Price When Probation Turns on Profit,
SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2016/mar/12/
poor-offenders-pay-high-price-when-probation-turns.
54. Appleman, supra note 8, at 1485.
55. Phelps, supra note 34, at 64.
56. See COLUM. JUST. LAB, TOO BIG TO SUCCEED: THE IMPACT OF THE GROWTH OF
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 7 (2018),
https://justicelab.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/Too_Big_to_Succeed_Report
_FINAL.pdf.
57. See WENDY SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, MASS
INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2019 (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/pie2019.html. This may also be because overcrowded prisons are unconstitutional.
For example, in Brown v. Plata, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the overcrowded California
prison, which was 300% over its capacity, violated the Eighth Amendment. 563 U.S. 493,
517–22 (2011).
58. U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., NJC 251148, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES,
2016 (2018); U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., NJC 153849, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1980).
59. ALEXI JONES, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, CORRECTIONAL CONTROL 2018:
INCARCERATION AND SUPERVISION BY STATE (2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/correctionalcontrol2018.html.
60. See SAWYER & WAGNER, supra note 57.
61. JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE
UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990, at 228 (1993).
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private probation corporations do not merely supervise
probationers, but rather they “mostly function as community
surveillance workers” by exercising quasi-governmental authority
to increase payouts.62
II. FOR-PROFIT PRIVATE PROBATION: A POTENTIALLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIME
Impoverished state and local governments are understandably
eager to relinquish authority to private companies—after all,
maintaining prisons and supervising probation is incredibly costly,
while private probation is practically costless to taxpayers.63
Several studies confirm this disparity. For example, the American
Bar Association recently estimated that government probation
services usually cost taxpayers an average of $3,650 per
probationer, per year.64 In contrast, private probation companies
have been known to charge double, triple, even eight times more
than this amount, but to offenders rather than taxpayers.65 And
because private companies can alleviate the tax burden imposed by
probation by maximizing profits, these companies have a strong
incentive to “nickel and dime” their probationers for even
relatively minor violations in order to maintain their job security.66
Granted, the mere fact that private probation companies are
pursuing more profits than their state-run counterparts is not
enough to demonstrate a constitutional violation, as the Georgia
Supreme Court recently held in 2014.67 Unless a statute facially
62. TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE 157 (2014).
63. Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc., NEW YORKER (June 16, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc.
64. Kim Soffen, The Price of Electronic Prison, HARV. POL. REV. (July 14, 2014),
http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/price-electronic-prison.
65. Laura I. Appleman, Cashing in on Convicts: Privatization, Punishment, and the People,
2018 UTAH L. REV. 579, 624 (2018) (suggesting private probation companies doubled the
state’s fees); Brief for Southern Center for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Cross-Appellant at 20, Sentinel Offender Servs. v. Harrelson, 286 Ga. 665 (2010) (suggesting
private probation companies charge triple what the state charges); Avlana K. Eisenberg,
Incarceration Incentives in the Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71, 112 (2016) (discussing an
outlier case of a private company charging eight times higher than the state’s rate).
66. Shane Bauer, My Four Months as a Private Prison Guard—Chapter 2: Prison
Experiments, MOTHER JONES (July 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/
06/cca-private-prisons-corrections-corporation-inmates-investigation-bauer/#chapter-2.
67. Sentinel Offender Servs. v. Glover, 766 S.E.2d 456, 467 (Ga. 2014) (holding that “the
mere act of privatizing these services does not violate due process” or Bearden).
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allows a private probation company to violate due process, courts
often presume that “the alleged injuries suffered by the plaintiffs
are not a consequence of the privatization of probation services per
se, but rather result from wrongful acts allegedly committed by [the
company’s] employees.”68
But much has changed since 2014. At the state level, the Georgia
State Legislature recently began considering a bill to statutorily
increase the monthly fees that private probation companies may
charge.69 This change could be the kind of facial hook that the
Georgia Supreme Court held was lacking in 2014, especially
considering that 80% of the state’s 200,000 probationers are now
supervised by private companies.70 Similarly, in 2016, two judicial
candidates were elected by Arkansas voters after promising to
abolish their county’s private probation system.71 As promised,
these judges: (1) dissolved their county’s relationship with a private
probation company, and (2) implemented an “Amnesty Days”
program forgiving all fees that probationers owed to that private
probation company.72 Accordingly, there may be a growing
appetite for private probation reform at the local government level.
The federal government has also shown more interest in
preventing private probation abuses since 2014. For example, in
2017, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
found a private probation company to be “[a]rresting and detaining
probationers solely for failure to pay, without conducting an
inquiry into whether the nonpayment is willful . . . precisely the
conduct the Supreme Court rejected in Bearden.”73
Given these recent developments, criminal justice claimants
could see greater success in their actions against unlawful privation

68. E.g., id.
69. Hassan Kanu, Constitutional Flaws in Private Probation Companies Laid Bare by 11th
Circuit, 3 WESTLAW TODAY (Oct. 2, 2020, 7:00 PM).
70. Id.
71. Grindstaff, supra note 49, at 809–10.
72. Id.; see also Just. Network, Inc. v. Craighead County., No. 3:17CV00169 JM, 2017
WL 5762397, at *1–2 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 28, 2017), aff’d, 931 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2019).
73. Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 770 (M.D. Tenn.
2015) (citation omitted). The parties subsequently agreed to a $14.3 million settlement. $14.3
Million Settlement For Probationers Subject to Extortion by Private Company, PRISON LEGAL NEWS
(May 7, 2018), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2018/may/7/143-millionsettlement-probationers-subject-extortion-private-company/. For a more detailed
discussion on Bearden, see infra at section II.A.2.
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probation practices. If current trends continue, litigants are likely to
challenge private probation systems under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
A. The Due Process Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees probationers “due
process of law” before the government may deprive them of “life,
liberty, or property.”74 In the context of private probation,
challengers often bring two arguments under this clause. First,
plaintiffs attempt to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation
by showing that a for-profit business’75 Second, because many
judges allow private probation companies to prepare arrest
warrants without even “inquir[ing] into the facts around a
probationer’s alleged violation,”76 Such state action violates Bearden
v. Georgia, however, particularly its holding that “‘[t]here can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has.77 Each of these theories will be discussed
in greater detail below.
1. The Judicial Duty of Neutrality
Probationers have a right to be sentenced by a fair and impartial
tribunal.78 Because most judges heavily rely on the testimonies of
private probation case workers during probation hearings,79 such
reliance can become constitutionally problematic when for-profit
probation officers testify out of financial self-interest.80 Under these
circumstances, an officer is more likely to recommend longer
probation terms and heightened monitoring costs instead of
seeking to efficiently rehabilitate probationers.81
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
75. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
76. Profiting From Probation, supra note 6.
77. 461 U.S. 660, 664 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 19 (1956)).
78. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 133.
79. Profiting From Probation, supra note 6.
80. See Joshua Holland, Private Prison Companies Are Embracing Alternatives to
Incarceration, NATION (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/
private-prison-companies-are-embracing-alternatives-to-incarceration/.
81. Appleman, supra note 65, at 591.
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However, because courts have routinely determined that
probation employees are officers of the court, private probation
officers cannot make such self-interested recommendations. For
example, in United States v. Reyes, the Second Circuit held that a
federal probation officer functioned as the “eyes and ears” of the
court, “a neutral information gatherer with loyalties to no one but
the court.”82 And in United States v. Espalin, the Sixth Circuit
established that when a probation officer “has an interest in the
outcome of the case or some other conflict of interest, there likely
would be a basis to question the probation officer’s objectivity.”83
At least one state court has also held that probation officers cannot
also be private investigators because such a combination would
create an impermissible conflict of interest.84
While courts have frequently held that probation officers must
abide by the duty of neutrality as officers of the court, most courts
have refused to recognize an inherent conflict of interest in the forprofit private probation regimes themselves.85 For example, in
Idaho, “a decade-long experiment with private probation collapsed
following complaints of profiteering and illegal fees.”86 Similarly,
after a Tennessee judge illegally received tens of thousands of
dollars in kickbacks from private probation companies,87 many
probationers were still afraid to leave their homes because they
have seen the state’s corrupt system fine probationers for less.88
Finally, the private probation companies “Red Hills Community
Probation” and “Judicial Correction Services,” which have
operations in Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi, have been
repeatedly sued for extortion, racketeering, and other charges.89 And
there are likely even more abuses that have not yet come to light,
each of which would similarly show how private probation
companies violate the judicial duty of neutrality.
82. U.S. v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 455 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted).
83. U.S. v. Espalin, 350 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 2003) (Lawson, J., concurring).
84. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gregg, 396 A.2d 797 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
85. See, e.g., Sentinel Offender Servs. v. Glover, 766 S.E.2d 456, 467 (Ga. 2014) (holding
that Georgia’s private probation system is not “so fundamentally unfair that it fails to
comport with our notions of due process”).
86. Stillman, supra note 63.
87. Id.
88. Cohen, supra note 53.
89. Id.
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An additional cause for concern is that many states permit
private probation companies to be totally exempt from open records
laws, meaning their potentially clandestine operations can be easily
hidden from the public.90 Although all fifty states plus D.C. have
open records laws, each jurisdiction exempts private probation
companies from such laws, except Connecticut, Florida, Tennessee,
and South Carolina.91 Furthermore, “[s]tates rarely regulate the fees
charged by private probation companies, allowing them to charge
whatever amount they desire.”92 Even the cost of a single drug test
imposed by a private probation company, for example, can range
from $5–50.93 Therefore, without the ability to conduct thorough
information requests, it is difficult to determine how much private
probation companies profit over the routine management of
their probationers.
This evidence suggests that many private probation companies
are no longer “performing adjudicatory functions . . . under
contract, set by a municipal judge or prosecutor.”94 For example,
the FBI recently filed a complaint alleging that “the significant
extent to which revenue considerations have shaped court
operation” in Missouri was enough to infer that the State had
“undermine[d] the fundamental fairness and impartiality of the
court in violation” of constitutional due process.95 Thus, federal
courts may have an appetite to begin inquiring into whether the
fee-collecting incentives and other profit-maximizing strategies of
private probation companies similarly shape court operations in
violation of the Due Process Clause.96

90. See, e.g., Geraghty & Velez, supra note 47, at 475-476 (discussing GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-8-106 (2010)).
91. CITIZENS FOR RESP. & ETHICS IN WASH., PRIVATE PRISONS A BASTION OF SECRECY 19
(2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/CREW_Private_Prisons_
FOIA_secrecy_report_02_18_2014.pdf.
92. Laura I. Appleman, The Treatment-Industrial Complex: Alternative Corrections,
Private Prison Companies, and Criminal Justice Debt, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2020).
93. See TARA GAMBOA-EASTMAN, W. CENT. ON L. & POVERTY, THE PROBLEM WITH
PROBATION: A STUDY OF THE RACIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PROBATION FEES IN CALIFORNIA
9 (2018), https://wclp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TheProblemWithProbation_
GamboaEastman_ForWCLP_Final.pdf.
94. Kanu, supra note 69, at 2.
95. See Complaint at 23, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180 (E.D. Mo.
filed Feb. 10, 2016).
96. Profiting From Probation, supra note 6.
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Regardless, although courts are somewhat hesitant to presume
that profit-maximizing probation companies inherently violate the
interests of probationers when they testify in hearings or prepare
warrants,97 courts are condemning several specific private probation
practices. For example, a unanimous court for the Eleventh Circuit
recently held that a private probation company violated the Due
Process Clause because it could freely: (1) “extend[] the duration of
probation,” such as when it changed a sentence from one year to
two years; (2) “increase[] the fines that probationers owed,” by as
much as $100 in some cases; and (3) “add[] substantive conditions
of probation,” including ad hoc requirements that probationers
abstain from alcohol.98 Accordingly, because the private company
made these alterations without any meaningful review from a
municipal judge, “its revenue depended directly and materially on
whether and how it made sentencing decisions,” a textbook
example of non-neutrality.99
Therefore, private probation companies that similarly
benefit “directly and materially” from their own sentencing
recommendations may be held liable as well.100
2. Bearden v. Georgia
Additionally, various private probation companies could also
be violating the Supreme Court’s holding in Bearden v. Georgia.101 In
Bearden, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents
courts from revoking probation merely for a defendant’s willful
nonpayment of fines and restitution.102 More specifically, the
Bearden Court determined that courts must make findings as to
whether nonpayment was willful or whether “the probationer
could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the
resources to do so” before revoking a defendant’s probation.103
However, because Bearden also allows each state to determine
what constitutes an individual’s willful refusal to pay, Bearden

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 5.
Harper v. Pro. Prob. Servs. Inc., 976 F.3d 1236, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1244.
See id.
461 U.S. 660 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 672.
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means different things to different courts,104 making it relatively
easy for some local governments to bypass.105
For example, some courts have held that Bearden does not apply
when defendants are given a choice between a large fine, jail time,
or probation plus community service—which judges are often
statutorily required to do.106 According to these courts, Bearden
“does not bar sentencing a defendant to probation or jail if the
defendant is unable to pay a fine instead.”107 Worse, according to
the ACLU, a handful of states implementing private probation
services do not even hold hearings to determine whether a
probationer can pay at all.108
This inconsistency is particularly concerning in the private
probation context, where many courts rely on probation services to
determine whether an offender is unable to pay fines or fees.109 This
reliance often takes the form of hearing testimonies from private
probation officers at violation hearings, or allowing self-interested
private probation officers to make ex parte recommendations and
even draft their own warrants.110 Making matters worse, “[t]he
concurrence between the probation officer’s recommendation and
the actual sentence imposed in most cases underscores the federal
courts’ heavy reliance on the probation officer’s expertise.”111
Because it is much cheaper for a private probation company to
request that a probationer be incarcerated than it is for a company
to continue providing services for indigent probationers, private
probation case workers have an incentive to violate Bearden.112
Similarly, private probation companies have “little financial
incentive” to report probationers who violate the conditions of their
104. See Shapiro, supra note 37.
105. CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 57–58 (2015) (describing municipal court practices as “directly at odds”
with Bearden).
106. Brown, supra note 50, at 1433 (citing Shanklin v. State, 211 So. 3d 757, 760 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2016)); see Developments in the Law: Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1740–41 (2015).
107. Brown, supra note 50, at 1433 (emphasis added).
108. State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1024,
1027–28 (2016).
109. Profiting From Probation, supra note 6, at 68.
110. Id. at 70.
111. Stephen A. Fennell & William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and
Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1613,
1668 (1980).
112. Developments in the Law: Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1735 (2015).
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release but consistently make their payments, which is equally
constitutionally problematic.113
Thus, self-interested private probation officers can frustrate the
kind of thorough inquiry required by Bearden.114 “‘Automatic’
conversion of a [defaulted] fine into a jail term is forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause.”115 Although Bearden only weakly
constrains courts when they consider a defendant’s inability to pay
in the context of public probation,116 perhaps Bearden should apply
with even greater force in the context of private probation.117
In fact, at least one federal district court agrees with this
argument. In September 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee found that a private probation company was
unconstitutionally “[a]rresting and detaining probationers solely
for failure to pay, without conducting an inquiry into whether the
nonpayment is willful[,] . . . precisely the conduct the Supreme
Court rejected in Bearden . . . .”118 In particular, the court found that
the private probation company was “trap[ping] probationers in a
pernicious cycle for years on end” by conditioning probation on
payment, seeking arrest warrants when payments were late, and
then “settling” with criminal defendants by slapping on a longer
probation term in lieu of prison time.119 And this was all done
without ever inquiring into a probationer’s indigent status.
Therefore, for the reasons articulated above, Bearden could lend
additional support to prospective challengers of for-profit
private probation.120
B. Excessive Fines
In Timbs v. Indiana, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that
the Eighth Amendment limits the ability of state and local

113. Id.
114. Profiting From Probation, supra note 6, at 5.
115. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 676 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
116. See Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions
as Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 524 (2011); LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CHARGING INMATES PERPETUATES MASS INCARCERATION 1–2 (2015).
117. Brown, supra note 50, at 1434.
118. Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 770 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
119. Id. at 764.
120. State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1024,
1027 (2016).
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governments to impose excessive fines on probationers.121 Writing
for the majority, Justice Ginsburg noted that “[e]xorbitant tolls
undermine other constitutional liberties . . . [as] fines may be
employed ’in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of
retribution and deterrence,’ for ’fines are a source of revenue,’ while
other forms of punishment ’cost a State money.’”122 Justice Thomas,
in his separate concurring opinion, also noted how the Eighth
Amendment was likely created in response to the English Stuarts,
whose “strong interest” in criminal fines “had a tendency to aggravate
the punishment” beyond what the law should have allowed.123
Like the government actors addressed in Timbs, for-profit
probation companies similarly have a “strong interest” in costs and
fees, which in turn, likely “aggravate the punishment” imposed on
probationers. This financial incentive offends “both the appearance
and reality of fairness.”124 Indeed, private probation companies
have contributed to the constant rise in supervision fees charged to
probationers and parolees over the last forty years,125 all while state
statutes frequently prohibit courts from considering an offender’s
indigent status when imposing fees and collection costs.126 It
is therefore no wonder why a judge recently described a
private probation company’s practices as “a judicially sanctioned
extortion racket.”127 At least to a certain extent, private probation
companies survive by fining excessively—otherwise they could not
turn a profit.128
Crucially, private probation companies have many fees at their
disposal. In particular, these companies can impose: (1) flat rate
supervision fees per month,129 (2) specific probation services fees

121. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
122. Id. at 689 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979, n.9 (1991)
(citations omitted)).
123. Id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 1 Hallam 490).
124. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
125. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 41.
126. Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277,
289 (2014).
127. Ethan Bronner, Judge in Alabama Halts Private Probation, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/us/judge-in-alabama-halts-private-probation.html.
128. Private probationary and parole supervision companies are thriving, even though
their contracts attempt to limit their profits. Appleman, supra note 8, at 1497–98 (describing
the mergers and acquisitions of several private firms and probationer monitoring companies).
129. Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L. J. 1381, 1407 (2018).
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per drug test,130 (3) fines owed for punishment, including any
outstanding amounts owed by “pay only” probationers,131 (4)
enrollment costs, and (5) other trumped-up surcharges.132
Regardless of the method of fee collection, these fees are excessive.
For example, private probation companies “have been known to
game the process to create extra costs, such as insisting that
defendants
serve
their
sentences
consecutively,
not
concurrently[,]” and most private probation companies charge
substantial interest on unpaid debts.133
Moreover, these fees or “costs of probation” are also almost
impossible for probationers to pay off. Only about half of private
probationers successfully meet their supervision obligations—
many of which pertain to the payment of supervision services—
whereas the other half is either sentenced to jail or else enters into
a settlement agreement with the private probation company,
resulting in even more probation fees and time.134 Failing probation
is therefore so likely to result in incarceration that the majority
of individuals charged with crimes are actually assessed as
“economic sanctions.”135
This self-perpetuating aspect of private probation fees was at
the heart of the aforementioned case from the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee.136 In that case, the court found
that a private probation company had unconstitutionally
“trap[ped] probationers in a pernicious cycle for years on end” by
conditioning probation on payment, seeking arrest warrants when
payments were late, and then “settling” with criminal defendants
by slapping on a longer probation term in lieu of prison time.137 In
fact, one of the plaintiff’s probation terms had “been extended at
least five times” using this tactic, “leaving her trapped” by the
private probation company for multiple years.138

130. Grindstaff, supra note 49, at 802.
131. Id.
132. See Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1175, 1177 (2014).
133. Appleman, supra note 8, at 1496–97.
134. JONES, supra note 59.
135. Harris et al., supra note 50, at 1785–86. See supra Section II.B on fees paid.
136. Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
137. Id. at 764.
138. Id.
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This kind of “pernicious cycle” implicates the Eighth
Amendment. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has “always been
sensitive to the possibility that important actors in the criminal
justice system may be influenced by factors that threaten to
compromise the performance of their duty.”139 This “sensitivity”
would persist even if private probation officers only had an indirect
pecuniary interest in the outcome of a case.140 But many private
probation companies often have direct incentives to delay probation
and acquire more fees.141 Just look to the State of Georgia, where
private probation companies collected more than $120 million
dollars in 2016 alone.142 This means that private companies
collected 80% of all monies collected from probationers in Georgia
courts that year.143 Accordingly, such “[e]xorbitant tolls” are a
much more substantial “source of revenue” than those in Timbs,144
and should be subject to heightened Eighth Amendment scrutiny.
For these reasons, claimants should be able to challenge the
particularly egregious practice of private probation companies
under both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
III. NON-PROFIT PRIVATE PROBATION: A LAWFUL & FRUITFUL
ALTERNATIVE
A. The Relative Advantages of Religious Non-Profit Probation
Since its incipiency, American probation was created in
response to “the harsh and cruel precepts of a rigorous, repressive
criminal law.”145 Even the word “probation” itself was deliberately
selected to communicate society’s willingness to provide a “period
139. Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 (1987).
140. See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972).
141. See Carrie Teegardin, March Madness Bounty Put Squeeze on Sentinel Probationers,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/blog/investigations/marchmadness-bounty-put-squeeze-sentinel-probationers/6bjNWqlxQqvu4cuMkR5SKP/.
142. Akiva Freidlin, The Poor Shouldn’t Pay for Punishment, SLATE MAG. (Apr. 19, 2017,
3:57 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/04/georgias-pay-only-systemfundedgovernment-at-the-expense-of-the-poor.html.
143. RAY KHALFANI, GA. BUDGET & POL’Y INST., UNJUST REVENUE FROM AN
IMBALANCED CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM: HOW GEORGIA’S FINES AND FEES WORSEN RACIAL
INEQUITY 7 (2021), https://gbpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FinesAndFees.pdf.
144. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 684, 689 (2019).
145. U.N. Department of Social Affairs, supra note 22, at 81, 82.
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of proving oneself” to the accused, with a chance of “subsequent
forgiveness.”146 Indeed, the “Father of Probation,” John Augustus,
described the process of providing the first probation services in
the United States as one in which: “Great care was observed . . . to
take into consideration the previous character of the person, his
age, and the influences by which he would in future be likely to be
surrounded . . . .”147 Most notably, Augustus primarily looked for
probation workers who were known for having “a good heart.”148
Thus, most of the early probation officers in the United States were
“drawn from Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish church groups.”149
Given this history, it is therefore tragic that a “system that was
once for so long oriented by the idea of reintegration of prisoners
into the community is now oriented toward isolating and
containing this population.”150 As mentioned in the beginning of
this Note, since the states have preempted probation services, the
only remaining private probation providers are for-profit
companies, which, unlike their nineteenth century predecessors,
are no longer “principally concerned with enhancing the public
good.”151 Perhaps for this reason, for-profit probation officers are
not typically immunized from liability, as “the public interest
would be disserved by immunizing a profit-driven corporation
because such immunity would enable the corporation to prioritize
pennies over probationers without fear of accountability.”152
Yet this Note is not anti-probation. Quite the opposite:
Probation is a good cost-effective alternative to incarceration for
most non-violent misdemeanants, which individually cost
governments an average of $33,274 per year.153 Neither is this Note
anti-private probation. Although the preceding Section shows how
for-profit private probation companies are likely violating the
Constitution, this Note ultimately concludes that non-profit private
146. Lindner, supra note 18, at 38.
147. AUGUSTUS, supra note 16, at 34.
148. Petersilia, supra note 14, at 156.
149. Id.
150. SIMON, supra note 61, at 228.
151. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168 (1992).
152. Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758, 768 (M.D.
Tenn. 2016).
153. Prison Spending In 2015, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://www.vera.org/publications/
price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/
price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends-prison-spending (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
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probation institutions could fundamentally reduce criminal
activity in the United States. Indeed, by safeguarding “[a] person’s
connection to their community, through employment, family ties,
religious practices, and social activities,” non-profit private probation
could dramatically increase each probationer’s social capital: “one of
the strongest protectors against criminal justice contact.”154
Most notably, of the many potential non-profit interests,
religious institutions are probably the best situated to continue John
Augustus’s legacy of “reforming offenders” through friendship
rather than through an exploitative payer-provider relationship.155
Indeed, religious institutions are already playing an increasingly
important role in the related area of jail bonds, which all kinds of
misdemeanants access each year to achieve “the goal of moving
towards larger changes in local criminal justice practices.”156
Especially considering the important role that a diverse set of
religious institutions played in creating the American probation
system, there is good reason to believe that religious institutions
could continue to serve secular and non-secular probationers today.
For unlike their self-interested, for-profit counterparts, religious
institutions have a legacy of advancing the interests of
probationers per their “broader beliefs regarding the overuse of
[criminal penalties] among particular neighborhoods, racial or
socioeconomic groups . . . .”157 The same can be said for nonreligious, but philanthropic non-profits. But religious institutions
have always played a unique role in American probation.
At the time of this Note’s publication, there are currently few—
if any—religious probation services in operation. To surmise what
non-profit, religiously funded private probation might look like,
however, one need only examine the related sector of alternative
conviction rehabilitation, where religions are sometimes allowed
to operate.
Preliminarily, just as many probationers are required to use
alcohol breathalyzers or take drug panel tests, many drug
offenders are similarly required to receive addiction treatment care.
154. Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-Carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 680
(2019) (emphasis added).
155. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
156. Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 600 (2017).
157. Id.; see also ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED
MONDAY 49–50 (1999).
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Indeed, roughly 80% of criminal offenders have abused drugs or
alcohol on at least one occasion, and almost 50% struggle with
ongoing addictions to the same.158 Incarcerating these low-level
drug offenders rarely results in rehabilitation, however, which is
why several states such as California actually divert all drug court
offenders to treatment programs instead of prisons.159 Notably,
most of these rehabilitation centers are for-profit: and they often cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars and “have a poor track record, far
worse than non-profit halfway houses and rehabilitation centers.”160
Faith-based rehabilitation centers, by contrast, have an excellent
addiction recovery record.161 In fact, some of the nation’s bestknown recovery programs—Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous—are expressly faith-based.162 Moreover, faith-based
programs often boast lower recidivism rates than their state-run
and for-profit counterparts.163 For example, one study found that
while graduates of a religious rehabilitation program had a threeyear recidivism rate of 16%, graduates from a comparably similar
secular program had a much higher rate of 36%.164 These effects also
improve over time. According to another study, even one faithbased session resulted in a recidivism rate of 18%, but 10 sessions
lowered the rate to 9%.165
These results apply to the specific context of private probation
as well. For example, one study found that religious programs
resulted in comparatively fewer infractions and misconduct,

158. Drug Use and Crime: Drugs and Crime Facts, U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
https://bjs.ojp.gov/drugs-and-crime-facts/drug-use-and-crime (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
159. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 1210(a)–(d), 3063.1.
160. Appleman, supra note 65, at 592.
161. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. NAT’L INST. OF CORRS., RESIDENTIAL FAITH-BASED PROGRAMS IN
STATE CORRECTIONS (2005), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/020820.
pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
162. See Max Dehn, How It Works: Sobriety Sentencing, the Constitution, and Alcoholics
Anonymous, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 255, 296 (2006).
163. See Lisa Hutchinson Wallace, Stacy C. Moak & Nathan T. Moore, Religion as An
Insulator of Delinquency in Schools, 29 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 217 (2005).
164. Byron R. Johnson, Assessing the Impact of Religious Programs and Prison Industry on
Recidivism: An Exploratory Study, 28 TEX. J. CORR. 1, 7 (2002).
165. Byron R. Johnson, Religious Programs and Recidivism Among Former Inmates in Prison
Fellowship Programs: A Long-Term Follow-Up Study, 21 JUST. Q. 329, 347 (2004). Like many
social science studies, the true statistical significance of these studies may be open to some
debate, however.

1817

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:6 (2022)

presumably including probation terms as well.166 Additionally, one
study found that the benefits from participating in religious
programs persist even after controlling for religious belief,
temperament, sex, race, and other factors.167 Thus, even nonreligious or atheist participants similarly benefit from faith-based
programs as well.168
At the very least, these studies demonstrate how “major
religious organizations . . . are often intricately involved in postincarcerative life.”169 Indeed, religious organizations built the
probation system, and that legacy has since become “hardwired
into our historical and constitutional understanding of criminal
justice.”170 As such, religious organizations are uniquely able to
make “the enforcement of criminal law more responsive to the
values, priorities, and felt needs of local communities.”171 Because
they have done so for centuries.
B. The Potential Pitfalls of Religious Non-Profit Probation
Admittedly, religious institutions are certainly capable of
violating probationers’ First Amendment rights by forcing
religious tenets on program participants. For example, religious
institutions could potentially subvert the Thirteenth Amendment
by “pervert[ing] prison reform into a neoliberal variation of
convict leasing, in which industry and state collude to redeem

166. Scott D. Camp, Dawn M. Daggett, Okyun Kwon & Jody Klein-Saffran, The Effect of
Faith Program Participation on Prison Misconduct: The Life Connections Program, 36 J. CRIM. JUST.
389 (2008).
167. Kent R. Kerley, Heith Copes, Richard Tewksbury & Dean A. Dabney, Examining
the Relationship Between Religiosity and Self-Control as Predictors of Prison Deviance, 55 INT’L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOLOGY. 1251 (2011).
168. Melvina T. Sumter, Religiousness and Post-Release Community Adjustment
(Aug. 3, 1999) (Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University) https://www.google.com/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwipttmX9un2AhVWg3IE
HSFB1IQFnoECAgQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ojp.gov%2Fpdffiles1%2Fnij%2F
grants%2F184508.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3axHeyU-lqdcxX1HUunsFZ (last visited Apr.
10, 2022).
169. Appleman, supra note 65, at 633.
170. Id. at 621.
171. Stephen F. Smith, Localism and Capital Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
105, 110 (2011).
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society’s undesirables.”172 A similar argument was recently
brought against the Oklahoma-based Christian Alcoholics &
Addicts in Recovery (CAAIR),173 a chicken ranch maintained by
offenders who work there in lieu of prison, and who have the
opportunity to receive a $1,000 stipend upon completing its faithbased program.174 Allegedly, these offenders “commonly suffer
acid burns, machine injuries, and bacterial infections” without
receiving proper medical attention, and are then threatened with
prison time if they “work too slowly.”175 CAAIR has also been
criticized for primarily using “work and prayer” to treat their
probationers’ drug and alcohol addictions,176 when at least some of
them probably require professional rehabilitation treatment.177
Although CAAIR is still in operation today, this example shows
how religious institutions might exploit convicts.178 Although nonprofit religious organizations may not have the same direct
financial incentive to impose costly fees on probationers, non-profit
organizations still have to balance their financial accounts like any
other business. Thus, even religious organizations could
theoretically exploit cheap convict labor to satisfy their own selfinterest, or at least prescribe the relatively costless “work and
prayer” solution on occasions where professional medical care is
probably required.
Second, faith-based probation services could potentially violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as well. For
example, the Second Circuit has held that mandating Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings can constitute an unconstitutional
establishment of religion when “[n]either the probation
172. Michelle Chen, How Prison Reform Could Turn the Prison-Industrial Complex into the
Treatment-Industrial Complex, NATION (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/
archive/how-prison-reform-could-turn-the-prison-industrial-complex-into-the-treatmentindustrial-complex/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Amy Julia Harris & Shoshana Walter, They Thought They Were Going to Rehab. They
Ended Up in Chicken Plants, REVEAL (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/article/
they-thought-they-were-going-to-rehab-they-ended-up-in-chicken-plants.
174. In 2014, only 25% of probationers completed CAAIR’s recovery program. Id.
175. Appleman, supra note 92, at 19.
176. Cory Doctorow, Prisoners Sent to Christian “Rehab” Diversion Programs Find
Themselves in Forced-Labor Camps, BOINGBOING (Oct. 5, 2017), https://boingboing.net/2017/
10/05/exactly-what-jesus-would-do.html. Church attendance is required the first four
months. Harris & Walter, supra note 173.
177. See Doctorow, supra note 176.
178. Id.
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recommendation, nor the court’s sentence, offered [defendant] any
choice among therapy programs.”179 Thus, because AA’s twelvestep approach instructs its members to admit that only God can
lead them to addiction recovery,180 the Second Circuit found that
the defendant was unconstitutionally “coerced into participating in
these religious exercises by virtue of his probation sentence.”181
On balance, however, these potentially unconstitutional
practices are unlikely to occur in the context of religious, non-profit
private probation for the following reasons.
First, unlike the highly deferential rational basis standard that
governs most contracts between governments and private
probation companies,182 contracts with religious actors are often
subject to heightened scrutiny.183 This fact alone, in addition to the
high probability that religious organizations would lose their
congregants if they violated the law, makes it relatively unlikely
that religious probation services would be able to exploit their
probationers in violation of the First, Eighth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Moreover, unlike private probation companies, religious
probation services would not depend on the fees charged to their
probationers. Rather, given that American religions are already
able to spend $1.2 trillion on other publicly available programs and
services each year without exploiting the populations they serve, it
is unlikely that things would be any different in the private
probation context.184 Indeed, religious organizations have
consistently spent more money on charitable endeavors than the
combined annual revenues of the ten largest tech companies in
the United States (including Amazon, Apple, and Google).185
179. Warner v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1075 (2d Cir. 1996).
180. Id. at 1070; see also Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479–80 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding the
same, but in the context of an inmate’s requirement to attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings).
181. Warner, 115 F.3d at 1075.
182. E.g., Sentinel Offender Servs. v. Glover, 766 S.E.2d 456, 470 (2014) (holding that
“the only restriction” between the private company and the government “is that the
conditions of probation it imposes be reasonable”).
183. E.g., Warner, 115 F.3d at 1076 (holding that “the non-sectarian nature of the A.A.
experience” ensures that its practices are subject to “Establishment Clause scrutiny”).
184. See Brian J. Grim & Melissa E. Grim, The Socio-Economic Contribution of Religion to
American Society: An Empirical Analysis, 12 INTERDISC. J. RES. ON RELIGION 2, 24–25 (2016).
185. Id. at 2; see also Margaret Visnji, US Top 10 Technology. Companies by 2016 Revenue,
REVENUES AND PROFITS (Feb. 23, 2019), https://revenuesandprofits.com/us-top-10technology-companies-by-2016-revenues/.
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Several years ago, the Catholic Church reaffirmed that “prisoners
must be respected and treated humanely,”186 and that each offender
must always retain “the possibility of redemption.”187 Compare
that supportive statement to an Alabama judge’s relatively recent
description of a for-profit probation service, calling it a
“disgraceful” and “judicially sanctioned extortion racket”
against probationers.188
Second, the Establishment Clause is not implicated where
probationers have a “genuine and independent private choice. . . .
without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic
nature” of the probation service at issue.189 Thus, so long as
probationers maintain some private choice, religious institutions
should be able to provide non-profit probation services. The
necessary extent of the probationer’s choice is not very demanding
either: courts may compel participation in faith-based programs
such as those provided by Alcoholics Anonymous so long as the
religious aspects of the program remain optional.190
Moreover, the fact that “Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish church
groups”191 have provided probation services long before the
government ever became involved is significant under the Court’s
recent Establishment Clause holding in American Legion.192 Indeed,
“[c]haritable organizations with religious affiliations historically
have provided social services with the support of their
communities and without controversy.”193 And religious
organizations should continue to provide such services so long as
the beneficiaries are free to opt for secular alternatives.
Therefore, given the relative advantages of non-profit religious
probation over for-profit probation, states should seriously

186. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2313 (discussing the treatment of
prisoners of war).
187. See also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2267.
188. Burdette v. Town of Harpersville, No. CV 2010-900183, 2012 WL 2995326 (Ala. Cir.
Ct., Shelby Cnty. July 11, 2012).
189. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc.,
509 F.3d 406, 425 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 488 (1986)) (citations omitted); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002)
(citing Comm. for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)).
190. Gray v. Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 2d 795, 802 (W.D. Va. 2006).
191. Petersilia, supra note 14, at 156.
192. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
193. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988) (citing S. Rep. No. 98-496, p. 10 (1984)).
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consider returning the reigns to the selfless and communityminded religious actors who created the American probation
system in the first place.194
CONCLUSION
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the law has “always been
sensitive to the possibility that important actors in the criminal
justice system may be influenced by factors that threaten to
compromise the performance of their duty.”195 Indeed, the Due
Process and Excessive Fines Clauses of the Constitution prohibit
the ways in which many for-profit companies “trap probationers in
a pernicious cycle for years on end.”196
In addition to these constitutional requirements, there are also
important moral obligations to continue John Augustus’s “great
movement in the reformation of offenders.”197 Like the common law
precedents establishing prisoner rights, this moral legacy of restoring
each offender’s sense of humanity is equally “hardwired into our
historical and constitutional understanding of criminal justice.”198 As
such, the religious institutions that initially created this moralitybased probation system should continue to play a role in ensuring
that “the enforcement of criminal law [is] more responsive to the
values, priorities, and felt needs of local communities.”199
Indeed, “[c]haritable organizations with religious affiliations
historically have provided social services with the support of their
communities and without controversy,” and they should continue
to do so as long as their beneficiaries are free to decide between
secular or non-secular alternatives.200 Granted, some may argue
that this practice risks allowing faith-based programs to accomplish
their “ulterior motives and intentions” of coercing religious
expression.201 But for the reasons articulated supra, such
contentions are ultimately misguided.
194. Petersilia, supra note 14, at 156.
195. Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 (1987).
196. Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 763 (M.D. Tenn. 2015).
197. See supra text accompanying note 13.
198. Appleman, supra note 65, at 621.
199. Smith, supra note 171, at 110.
200. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988).
201. Christopher M. Meissner, Prayer or Prison: The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory
Faith-Based Substance Abuse Treatment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 671, 710 (2006).
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First, the private choice of probationers to choose between
sentencing options—as many statutes already require judges to
do—eliminates any Establishment Clause concerns.202 Second,
there are sound policy reasons to support religious probation
services: Studies have shown that religious programs more
effectively reform criminals than their for-profit and state-run
counterparts, and for both religious and non-religious offenders
alike.203 Finally, religious organizations have almost always been
“intricately involved in post-incarcerative life,”204 and a
probationer’s connection to her community through religious
services continues to be “one of the strongest protectors against
criminal justice contact.”205 Thus, the uniquely important role that
religious organizations have played in the criminal justice system
should be formally re-recognized in the probation services context.
Consequently, we should not forget that the whole reason that
probation exists in the first place is because a group of religious
actors wished to disrupt the government’s “mechanical application
of the harsh and cruel precepts of a rigorous, repressive criminal
law.”206 Yet only a few decades after probation was invented to
provide relief from the government, the states took that system back
for themselves, only delegating their authority to for-profit actors
after concluding it would allow them to eliminate their government
debts. But probation still exists to provide relief from “repressive
criminal law”—from the government itself and from the for-profit
entities that do the government’s bidding. The call for probation
reform is therefore just as necessary in our day as it was in John
Augustus’s time. For in the words of Thomas Jefferson: “The
boisterous sea of liberty is never without a wave.”207 And given the
recent number of successful challenges against probation
companies, the tides are already turning. Let’s make probation nonprofit again.

202. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc.,
509 F.3d 406, 425 (8th Cir. 2007); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002).
203. See supra notes 168.
204. Appleman, supra note 65, at 633.
205. Arnett, supra note 154, at 680.
206. U.N. Department of Social Affairs, supra note 22, at 81–82.
207. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Rush (Oct. 20, 1820), in FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-1599.
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